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Abstract
This paper discusses the development of a new system of industrial concentration 
based on industry-bank relationships in Germany after World War II. Industry–bank 
relationships are important issues related to the system of corporate governance and 
German capitalism’s cooperative characteristics. These relationships developed through 
various mechanisms such as banks’ credit and securities businesses, the shareholdings 
and deposited stock system, assignment of directors from banks to corporations, and the 
advisory board system. We analyze new developments in Germany’s industrial systems 
based on industry–bank relationships from the perspectives of mechanisms of corporate 
inter-firm relationships and corporate governance. Drawing on this discussion, we clarify 
significance of new development in industry-bank relationships after World War II.
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2 Codetermination and Collaborative Systems of Corporate Governance in Industry–Bank 
Relationships
Ⅳ Significance of New Developments in Industry–Bank Relationships
I Research Problems
As Japan did after World War II, Germany developed its enterprises, industries, and 
economy by establishing systems of industrial concentration in their own ways while 
deploying and adapting technology and management methods from the United States. 
Industrial concentration exhibited new postwar developments in Germany. German 
characteristics of industrial concentration, which were based on prewar industry–bank 
relationships, included new developments in the industrial system that coordinated 
interests and shared information between industry and banks and between corporations. 
Monopolies that had been dissolved by the postwar occupation policy reconcentrated. In 
addition, the system of large corporate groups began to re-emerge and re-concentrate, and 
with it came new developments in the system of large corporate groups. The system played 
a crucial role in the formation of the German capitalism’s accumulation structure, the 
cornerstone of industrial concentration.
This phenomenon represented the transformation of the prewar system of industrial 
concentration that controlled markets on the basis of massive trust and wide-ranged 
cartels, which encompassed the entire industrial sector in the 1920s. From the perspective 
of market control, this new system, based on industry–bank relationships and large 
corporate groups, was an important element supporting the development of postwar 
productive forces and accumulation structures. Industrial concentration developed as an 
important process in the progress of German corporations while exhibiting new 
characteristics of cooperation in German capitalism. Above all, industry–bank 
relationships served as a cooperative system between industries and banks as well as 
among corporations themselves. Industrial system based on industry-bank relationships is 
also deeply related to the system of corporate governance in Germany. Therefore, it is very 
important to clarify the mechanisms and significance of the postwar system of industrial 
concentration and the cooperative nature of German capitalism. Many studies approach 
this theme from the perspective of economic and business histories, business management 
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studies, and financial economics
1)
. However, these studies do not always identify strategic 
functions that industrial systems based on industry-bank relationships have for business 
management.
In this paper, we will consider inter-firm relationships as a problem that was deeply 
connected with that of postwar German business management. We will explore the issues 
of inter-firm relationships between industries and banks in an “organic” industrial system 
and describe the significance of new developments in Germany’s industrial concentration. 
“Industry” here refers not only to the manufacturing industry but, in a broader sense, to 
non-financial industries, including distribution and service industries. The industrial 
system based on industry–bank relationships was fundamental to the development of 
financial capital interests, which was based on a market control system for large 
corporations.
When examining the characteristics of postwar industrial concentration in Japan and 
compare them with those in Germany, in Japanese six large industrial groups, enterprises 
were concentrated by interlocking stockholding and forming large corporations, which 
were horizontally rather than vertically joined within capital groups and had substantial 
holdings of other companies’ stocks. The large corporate groups formed in postwar Japan 
spanned several industries, with industrial corporations, banks, and trading companies at 
its core. The industrial groups comprised a full set of industries and conducted financing, 
interlocking stockholding, mutual business transactions, and joint investments internally. 
Banks and trading companies played a significant role in this scheme. These groups 
coordinated among themselves through an organization, the Network of Presidents, with 
decisions primarily made be by those in a certain position, such as presidents of group 
companies. However, banks did not always an absolute advantage, even though financial 
institutions formed the core of the Network of Presidents
2)
. Moreover, although industrial 
groups comprising full sets of industries were broadening, from the standpoint of inter-
1) See books and articles cited in this paper.
2) K. Maekawa, Nichidoku Hikaku Kigyoron eno Michi (Comparative Study of Japanese and German 
Enterprise), Tokyo, 1997, p.23, pp.58-9, p.247, pp.263-4, M. Miyamoto, T. Abe, M. Udagawa, M. Sawai, 
T. Kikkawa, Nihon Keieishi (Japanese Business History), Tokyo, 2007, pp.246-9, pp.252-3, H. Okumura, 
Nihon no Rokudai Kigyo Shudan (Six Japanese Large Corporate Groups), Tokyo, 1976, p.12, pp.21-3, G. 
Miyazaki, Sengo Nihon no Keizai Kiko (Japanese Economic System afrer WW II), Tokyo, 1966, pp.221-
2, pp.224-5, pp.227-8, T. Kikkawa, Kigyo Shudan no Seiritsu to sono Kino (Formation and Functions of 
Corporate Groups), M.Morikawa (ed.), Bijinesuman no tameno Sengo Keieishi Nyumon (An Introduction 
of Business History after WW II for Businessmen), Tokyo, 1992, pp.62-3, p.69, p.73, p.77.
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firm information sharing, the Network did not always adopt mechanisms that supported 
banks–industry relationships, as was the case in Germany. However, among these types of 
industrial groups, interlocking shareholding stabilized shareholders.
The industrial groups comprised large banks that were designated main banks to each 
group. These banks flexibly and resiliently supplied payment and settlement money 
needed for credit creation. These banks adopted the keiretsu financing system and capital 
procurement methods because Japanese corporations tended to use indirect financing in 
the postwar era. These banks also advised the large corporations on external financing
3)
. 
Keiretsu financing was, from the viewpoint of the six industrial groups’ main banks, a way 
to distribute risk and avoid extreme concentration of borrowers; moreover, it enabled the 
expansion of lending while saving banks’ screening and monitoring costs
4)
. In addition to 
corporate financing, another important function of the main banking system was corporate 
governance and monitoring
5)
. In corporate governance, Japanese banks and corporate 
groups functioned as a defense against external pressures by interlocking stockholdings 
within the groups. However, although Japanese banks executed financial functions within 
industrial groups, they failed to develop binding relationships with the large corporate 
groups and had rather weak control over the industries. Close examination of the banking 
system reveals that the Japanese banks were not universal banks and could not exercise 
voting rights using the deposited stocks system. Top management in Japanese 
corporations followed a one-tier system, which comprised board of directors who controlled 
management mechanisms and the assignment of directors from banks.
Compared with Japanese banks, banks in Germany broadly associated with large 
corporate groups rather than with a specific corporate group
6)
. These ties were significant 
for the mechanisms and functions of information sharing and coordination, particularly in 
the interest of industrial system-based relationships between industries and banks.
We will examine industrial system mechanisms based on inter-firm relationships in 
Germany (Section II), analyze them from the perspective of corporate governance (Section 
3) K. Suzuki, Nihon no Rokudai Kigyo Shudan (Japanese Corporate Groups), Tokyo, 1993, p.140.
4) A. Miyajima, Zaibatsu Kaitai (Dissolution of Zaibatsu), Hosei Daigaku Sangyo Jyoho Senta, J. 
Hashimoto, H. Takeda (eds.), Nihon Keizai no Hatten to Kigyo Shudan (Development of Japanese 
Eeconomy and Corporate Groups), Tokyo, 1992, p.238.
5) M. Aoki, H. Patrick, Introduction, M. Aoki, H. Patrick (eds.), The Japanese Main Bank System. Its 
Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.xxii.
6) K. Maekawa, op. cit., p.58.
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III), and explain the significance of the postwar development of industry–bank 
relationships (Section IV). In addition to the primary focus of this paper, which is the 
period from the 1950s to the 1970s, we will further consider the period that immediately 
follows as well as more current circumstances.
II Industrial System Mechanisms based on Industry–Bank 
Relationships
1 Banks’ Influence on Corporations through Credit and Securities Businesses
Let us now examine bank credit and securities businesses and the influence of banks 
on corporations based on these businesses. O. Jeidels (1905) noted that, in bank and 
industrial alliances, the formation of regular business relationships that were primarily 
financial in nature was the most basic type of alliance, and personal links through the 
assignment of directors to supervisory boards was a method complementing these 
relationships
7)
. Regarding creditor–debtor relationships, a 1979 report by the Gessler 
Committee, an advisory council to the Ministry of Finance, noted that most large 
corporations were able to procure capital outside of bank credit. In addition, the 30 largest 
corporations receiving credit had a considerable number of creditor–debtor relationships 
with financial institutions and credit organizations. Thus, we surmise that, apart from 
crises with debtor corporations, banks could not exert much influence on corporations 
through the supply of credit and house bank relationships did not exist in large 
corporations
8)
. However, H. Gerhardt (1982) noted that creditor–debtor relationships 
between banks and their debtors were not sufficiently examined by the Committee
9)
. He 
emphasized that credit-based financial relationships were strongly influencing corporate 
business policy
10)
. In addition, although H.O. Eglau (1989) mentioned instances of banks 
assigning supervisory board members to family-owned private corporations and German 
7) O. Jeidels, Das Verhältnis der deutschen Groβbanken zur Industrie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Eisenindustrie, Leipzig, 1905.
8) Vgl. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Hrsg.), Bericht der Studienkommission. Grundsatzfragen der 
Kreditwirtschaft (Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen, Heft 28), Frankfurt am Main, 
1979, S.157-8, S.160-2.
9) M. Gerhardt, Industriebezihungen der westdeutschen Banken, Frankfurt am Main, 1982, S.192.
10) Ebenda, S.107.
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subsidiaries of large foreign corporate groups, the positions of supervisory board members 
usually depended on long-term house bank-like relationships with the corporation
11)
. It 
was likely that banks’ exercising of management functions was facilitated by its character 
as a creditor and its supervisory post
12)
. For example, large banks and corporations formed 
close alliances through the creditor–debtor relationship and proposals presented at annual 
meetings were generally coordinated in advance
13)
.
Regarding securities business in financial institutions, the Gessler Committee reported 
concentration in only few large banks and ties between large corporations and banks, with 
securities business functioning as intermediaries. From the period of the 1950s to the 
1970s, specifically 1966–1975, top 10 financial institutions accounted for 44.7% of financial 
institutions participating in the Consortium for Issuance of Securities; domestic issuers of 
stocks, convertible bonds, and option bonds totaled 58.3% and foreign issuers totaled 70%. 
Among the 71 publicly traded companies, the three large banks—Deutsche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank, and Commerz Bank—accounted for more than 98.6% of issuances among 
all banks. These three banks accounted for a high percentage of consortium leaders and co-
managers at 81.7% and 80%, respectively
14)
. J. Edwards and K. Fischer (1994) revealed 
that the leaders of securities issuance syndicates were normally corporate house banks of 
joint stock companies, namely the three abovementioned banks
15)
.
Because the securities business grew in scale, house bank functions in the creditor–
debtor relationship and the security issue business became an important pillar of the 
industry–bank relationship. For example, Deutsche Bank had considerable power in both 
corporate finance and the overall economy because it offered payment of copious accounts, 
working capital, and fixed investment capital and made possible the underwriting of 
corporate capital increases and bond issues as a universal bank
16)
.
Regarding industry–bank relationships, in addition to the functions of the house bank 
11) H. O. Eglau, Wie Gott in Frankfurt: Die Deutsche Bank und die deutsche Industrie, Düsseldorf, 1989, 
S.181, S.261-3.
12) K. J. Hopt, Zur Funktion des Aufsichtsrats im Verhältnis von Industrie und Bankensystem, N. Horn, 
J. Kocka (Hrsg.), Recht und Entwicklung der Groβunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert. 
Wirtschaft-, sozial- und rechtshistorische Untersuchungen zur Industrialisierung im Deutschland, 
Frankreich, England und den USA, Göttingen, 1979, S.237.
13) K. Aizawa, Oshu Saikyo no Kinyu Teikoku (The Strongest Financial Empire in Europe), Tokyo, 1994, 
p.117.
14) Vgl. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Hrsg.), a. a. O., S.452, S.457.
15) J. Edwards, K. Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany, Cambridge, 1994, pp.215-6.
16) K. Aizawa, op. cit., p.4.
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in the security issue business and the intelligence that banks obtained by acting as 
intermediaries in the credit business, banks also exerted influence by exercising voting 
rights through bank-owned and deposited stocks; this laid the foundation for close ties. 
Thus, it is critical to comprehensively examine the interplay between the credit and 
securities businesses.
2 Banks’ Influence on Industry through Shareholdings and the Deposited 
Stock System
Let us now examine banks’ influence on industries in relation to bank shareholdings 
and the deposited stock system. According to the 1976/1977 report by the Monopoly 
Committee, the provision of essential competitive information to corporations by financial 
institutions, which owned stocks in those corporations, and the voting rights through 
proprietary ownership stocks or deposited stocks that were supplementary thereof, 
enabled banks to exert direct and indirect influence on the business policies of non-bank 
corporations
17)
. Such stock deposits in banks and banks’ proxies exercising the voting 
rights were a long-standing practice in Germany
18)
, and were legalized by the 1937 
Corporations Law
19)
. However, before World War II, a portion of shares deposited in banks 
was not exercised in annual meetings and large private shareholders often exercised their 
own shares
20)
. The exercising of voting rights as an industrial system based on industry–
bank relationships and banks’ assignment of members to supervisory boards were not 
significant until after World War II.
Regarding the banks’ influence on corporations, the impact of banks exercising voting 
rights through the deposited stock system was more important than the banks’ 
shareholding itself. However, even in this case, the influence from deposited stock voting 
rights was more often dependent on the shareholder ownership structure of these 
corporations, and this was most likely for publicly traded corporations with scattered 
17) Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachte 1976/77 (Haupugutachten I), Fortschreitenden Konzentration 
bei Groβunternehmen, Baden-Baden, 1978, S.338 (Tz.604).
18) Vgl. H-P. Schaad, Das Depotstimmrecht der Banken nach schweizerischem und deutschem Recht, 
Zürich, 1972, S.14-6.
19) H. Lindhardt, Wider das Depotstimmrecht der Banken, Die Aktiengesellschaft, 3.Jg, Heft 8, August 
1958, S.169, S.171, A. Gottschalk, Depotstimmrecht und die Macht der Banken, Die Tageszeitung, 
Nr.3108, 16.5.1990, S.11, H-P. Schaad, a. a. O., S.17.
20) H. Kuhlmann, Die Banken in der Hauptversammlung, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditswesen, 2.Jg, 
Heft 21, 1.11.1949, S.489.
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holdings and no control over shareholders
21)
.
Shares of individually or family owned corporations that were dispersed among small 
individual shareholders were sold through banks, which had cooperative relationships 
with the share issuing companies; often the voting rights associated with those shares 
were entrusted to the banks due to the friendly relationships with the issuing companies. 
The cooperative relationships between the banks and corporations were based on the 
latter’s direction. Such reciprocal relationships could also be observed in corporations with 
widely distributed shares. In contrast, among management-controlled corporations with 
widely distributed shares, the board of directors had a commanding position over the 
supervisory board, particularly in the top-level decision making and selection of 
supervisory board members from banks during the annual meeting; there were instances 
where the banks cooperatively exercised voting rights with the management
22)
.
Regarding the exercise of voting rights including bank deposited stocks, the total value 
of deposited stocks for instance increased from DM 28.9 billion at the end of 1970 to DM 
36.5 billion by the end of 1975. At the end of the 1970, 73.7% of those stocks were deposited 
in credit banks, and by the end of 1975, the number declined to 71.3%, which was 
nonetheless a high rate
23)
. According to a report by the Monopoly Committee, in terms of 
revenue, of the top 100 companies 56 corporations had 5% or more of their voting rights 
held by banks in the mid-1970s. Of those, 18 corporations had 75% of their voting rights 
held by banks, 12 between 50% and 75%, 11 between 25% and 50%, and 15 between 5% 
and 25%
24)
. In addition, examining the ratio of banks’ voting rights in representative 
corporations effective 1975, we see that AEG had 89.29%, Hoechst 88.62%, BASF 87.15%, 
Siemens 81.02%, and Bayer 79.09%, all rather high figures. August Thyssen held a 
relatively low rate at 45.28%. However, the proportion of owner-held stock voting rights 
held by banks in these corporations was not greater than 1%
25)
, whereas banks exercising 
voting rights through the deposited stocks system were significant.
21) M. Hein, H. Flöter, Macht der Banken――Folgerungen aus der bisherigen Diskussion, WSI 
Mitteilungen, 28.Jg, Heft 7, Juli 1975, S.352, R. Küstler, U. Zachert, M. Müller, Aufsichtsratepraxis, 
8.Aufl., Frankfurt am Main, 2006, S.78.
22) N. Sakuma, Doitsu no Kigyo Touchi (Corporate Governance in Germany), M. Nakamura (ed.), Kigyou 
Rinri to Kigyo Touchi (Business Ethics and Corporate Governance), Tokyo, 2003, pp.69-70, p.75.
23) H. Hansen, Die Wertpapierdepots der Bankkunden, Die Aktiengesellschaft, 22.Jg, Nr.6, 20.6.1977, 
S.161-2.
24) Monopolkommission, a. a. O., S.296.
25) Vgl. Ebenda, S.560.
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According to a survey by A. Gottschalk on the 32 of the 100 largest corporations with 
widespread shareholding or bank-owned stocks at 50% or more, in terms of added value in 
1984, the percentage of voting rights for all banks in 1986 (or for a portion of the 
corporations in 1987) was on average 82.67%. For 22 of those corporations, banks held 
voting rights greater than the 75%, required to make decisions on critical issues such as 
amending by-laws. Of the 32 corporations, the top three banks on average held 45.44% of 
the exercisable voting rights and over 50% in 15 corporations
26)
. A 1992 survey by T. 
Baums and F. Fraune, which analyzed in terms of added value 24 of the largest 100 public 
corporations that had a majority of widespread shareholding, showed that the percentage 
of voting rights held by banks at these companies’ annual meetings was on average 84.09% 
and those through the deposited stocks system was 60.95%. In addition, there were 11 
corporations with greater than 75% of voting rights through deposited stocks alone, 18 
corporations with banks holding 75% of their voting rights, and 17 corporations at more 
than 90%
27)
. A 1994 research by J. Edwards and K. Fischer also showed that German 
banks, in particular the top three banks, had a great deal of control over voting rights in 
corporations, and this control was primarily through proxy voting rights through the 
deposited stocks system
28)
.
3 Assignment of Directors from Banks to Corporations
The impact of exercising voting rights based on the deposited stocks system and bank 
shareholding was further realized though the assignment of directors from banks. The 
most secure foundation for banks to exert influence was built through personal ties with 
corporations, the assignment of supervisory board members that acted as information 
conduits, selection of directors, and the involvement in business policies. Thus, close ties 
between non-bank corporations and banks were the most important factor in generating 
the power held by banks
29)
. The influence of two particular factors, capital holding and 
voting rights through the deposited stocks system that were executed by supervisory board 
26) Vgl. A. Gottschalk, Der Stimmrechtseinfluβ der Banken in den Aktionärversammlungen von 
Groβunternehmen, WSI Mitteilungen, 41.Jg, Nr.5, Mai 1988, S.297-9.
27) Vgl. T. Baums, C. Fraune, Institutionelle Anlage und Publikumgesellschaft: Eine empirische 
Untersuchung, Die Aktiengesellschaft, 40.Jg, Nr.3, März 1995, S.98, S.103 (Tab.6).
28) J. Edwards, K. Fischer, op. cit., p.226.
29) G. Volkmann, B. Kronenberg, Bankenmacht und Aufsichtsrat, WSI Mitteilungen, 47.Jg, Nr.8, August 
1994, S.481.
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members, began to be felt, and these positions became a mechanism for the transfer of this 
power
30)
. Therefore, we will next consider this point.
The supervisory board, which held a central role in the assignment of directors from 
banks to corporations, appointed and dismissed directors, provided the board of directors 
with guidance on business management, and functioned beyond deliberation by approving 
rights in various critical matters. According to A. Herrhausen (1973), supervisory boards 
at the time were transforming from supervisory to advisory bodies for boards of directors; 
they exerted necessary control on the decision-making process to proactively avoid 
erroneous actions or measures
31)
. This observation was noted in the 1986 annual report of 
Deutsche Bank as well
32)
. Supervisory boards could indirectly influence business 
management through the appointment and dismissal of directors
33)
. The supervisory board 
was also involved in corporate policy decision-making by means of deliberation
34)
. 
Corporate law regulations allowed for the involvement of the supervisory board in business 
policy decision-making through the approval of rights by specific board of directors by 
means of by-laws or supervisory board decisions. In these cases, the supervisory board 
formed a second decision-making body along with the board of directors
35)
. For instance, if 
the supervisory board executed its advisory function and delivered an opinion on the board 
of directors’ decision making, the chairman of the supervisory board played an important 
role as corporate policies were collaboratively created
36)
. Although explicit guidance by the 
supervisory board to the board of directors was forbidden by corporate law, it was regularly 
observed; in fact, some research notes the significant gap between the law and actual 
practice
37)
. Nevertheless, the relationship between the supervisory board and the board of 
directors assumed diverse forms depending on the company.
30) Vgl. J. Böhm, Der Einfluβ der Banken auf Groβunternehmen, Hamburg, 1992, S.222.
31) A. Herrhausen, Überwachen allein genügt nicht, Manager Magazin, 2/1973, S.32.
32) Deutsche Bank AG, Geschäftsbericht für das Jahr 1986, S.17.
33) K. Bleicher, K-D. Bortel, R. Kleinmann, H. Paul, Unternehmungsverfassung und Spitzenorganisation, 
Zeitschrift Führung+ Organisation, 53.Jg, Heft 1, 1984, S.28-9.
34) E. Gutenberg, Funktionswandel des Aufsichtsrats, Zeitschrift fürBetriebswirtschaft,40.Jg, 
Ergänzungsheft, Dezember 1970, S.3, S.5-6.
35) K. Bleicher, L. Diethard, H. Paul, Unternehmungsverfassung und Spitzenorganisation. Führung 
und Überwachung von Aktiengesellschaften im internationalen Vergleich, Wiesbaden, 1989, S.55, E. 
Gutenberg, a. a. O., S.6.
36) J. Böhm, a. a. O., S.206.
37) K. Bleicher, L. Diethard, H. Paul, a. a. O., S.55.
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(1) Information Sharing System and Banks’ Assignment of Directors
We will first examine information sharing systems enabled by the assignment of 
directors from banks to corporations. By integrating finance-based information with that 
obtained from the assigned supervisory board members, it became possible for banks to fill 
an advisory and leadership capacity in these corporations and obtain information valuable 
to external borrowers. By obtaining information on borrowers, corporate sales, and 
financial statuses of supplies of credit, banks could gather substantial inside information 
on multiple corporations; it enabled them to act as storehouses of information and 
information conduits
38)
. Specialized financial information and experience and guidance 
necessary to help the board of directors avoid mistakes were important factors in 
strengthening the role and significance of supervisory board member positions
39)
. 
Regarding corporations being assigned supervisory board members from banks, the 
preferential status of easier access to good information sources helped them form closer 
relationships
40)
.
From a corporation’s internal functional perspective, banks sharing information, 
particularly know-how, often acted as a type of corporate consultant. On the other hand, 
for external functioning, this system of information sharing among corporations, with bank 
representatives on the supervisory board acting as intermediaries, spread further 
contingent on the likelihood of contact between corporations and the supervisory board, 
that is, mainly through bank-assigned supervisory board member
41)
.
The assignment of supervisory board members was also important for coordination 
among various departments, and the most decisive point for the overall system
42)
. Banks 
were familiar with issues within industries and provided advice and guidance for decision-
making to corporate borrowers across the broad categories of management. For 
corporations receiving the directors, the assignment of directors from banks was very 
significant for obtaining opinions on the overall management as well as for procuring 
capital
43)
. Although relatively few banks were represented on the supervisory board, banks 
38) T. Uetake, Kinyu Kikan to Kigyo (Financial Institutions and Enterprises), T. Takahashi, T. Onishi 
(eds.), Doitsu no Kigyo (German Enterprise), Tokyo, 1997, p.104.
39) Vgl. Deutsche Bank AG, a. a. O., S.17.
40) H. O. Eglau, a. a. O., S.192.
41) K. J. Hopt, a. a. O., S.235-8.
42) Ebenda, S.238.
43) A. Busse, Depotstimmrecht der Banken, Wiesbaden, 1962, S.51.
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performed overall coordination in the best manner possible; however, this allowed the 
control of large banks’ positions through supervisory board representation
44)
.
The supervisory board chairman could obtain all sorts of important and internal 
information through the directors’ reports on critical matters
45)
. If a bank representative 
was assigned to a corporation and later appointed the chairman of the supervisory board, 
the representative could exert tremendous influence on decision-making in the corporation 
as opposed to other supervisory board members.
(2) Assignment of Directors and Collaborative Relations among Banks
We will now examine the assignment of directors that were based on collaborative 
relationships among banks. For example, we see that the top three banks, being the 
largest shareholders, could exercise voting rights through the deposited stocks system. 
Furthermore, these banks created collaborative relationships with combined capital 
complementing the voting rights of banks
46)
. This could be seen in the banks’ annual 
meetings with banks exercising voting rights. A. Gottschalk’s survey analyzed the total 
number of shares and deposited stocks owned by investment firms and their parent banks 
and noted that the percentage of Deutsche Bank’s voting rights in 1986 was 47.17% and 
that for the top three banks was 60.36%. Dresdner Bank’s percentages of shares and 
deposited stocks were 47.08% and 64.04%, respectively, while Commerz Bank’s 
percentages were 34.58% and 60.81%, respectively; these were considerably high rates
47)
. 
In addition, against the total rate of voting rights, the 1992 research by T. Baums and F. 
Fraune revealed that Deutsche Bank’s rate of voting rights was 32.07% and that among 
the top three banks was 49.24%. At Dresdner Bank these percentages were 44.19% and 
53.66% and at Commerz Bank they were 18.49% and 48.27%
48)
. Thus, the top three banks 
held a very high percentage of shares with voting rights, enabling them to collaboratively 
and effectively control their annual meetings
49)
. H. Pfeiffer observed that the controller of 
large banks were the large banks themselves
50)
. These collaborative inter-bank 
44) J. Edwards, K. Fischer, op. cit., p.220.
45) Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Hrsg.), a. a. O., S.116.
46) T. Uetake, op, cit., p.106.
47) A. Gottschalk, Der Stimmrechtseinfluβ der Banken in den Aktionärversammlungen von 
Groβunternehmen, S.297-8.
48) Vgl. T. Baums, C. Fraune, a. a. O., S.106 (Tab.11).
49) J. Böhm, a. a. O., S.75.
50) H. Pfeiffer, Groβbanken und Finanzgruppen. Ausgewählte Ergebnisse einer Untersuchung der 
13New System of Industrial Concentration Based on Industry-Bank Relationships in Germany after World War II（Yamazaki）
relationships laid the foundation for control over large banks and such control influenced 
and controlled many industrial corporations.
In addition to the collaborative relationships that could be found in joint funding 
between banks
51)
, in the exercising of voting rights through the deposited stocks system, 
banks could transfer voting rights deposited by customers to third parties such as other 
trusted banks
52)
. Even the transfer of voting rights through the deposited stocks system 
from smaller banks to large banks strengthened the influence of these collaborative inter-
bank relationships on corporations
53)
.
Banks had similar collaborative systems for financing because, in the case of the top 
three banks’ consortium for issuance of securities, positions, rankings, and allocations 
were approved in a fixed fashion
54)
. J. Edwards and K. Fischer’s 1994 research noted that 
for a long period of time the structure of this bank syndicate was extremely stable
55)
. The 
top three banks acted collaboratively in the exercise of voting rights at annual meetings, 
and for the most part, were immovable as supervisory positions in the companies with 
which they dealt
56)
. Other banks also tended to collaborate with the top three banks
57)
. 
Further, voting rights and deposited stocks provided opportunities to constrain and 
suppress industrial relationships and competition among banks for industry work
58)
. This 
served an important role even in activities that included the assignment of members to the 
supervisory board. On this point, the creation of a “strong shareholder” system based on 
the universal banking system was important for the selection of supervisory board 
members, who acted as capital-side representatives during their annual meetings
59)
.
personellen Verflechtungen von Deutscher, Dresdner und Commerzbank, WSI Mitteilungen, 39.Jg, Nr.7, 
Juli 1986, S.475.
51) Vgl. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 2000/2001 (Hauptgutachten X IV), Netzwettbewerb durch 
Regulierung, Baden-Baden, 2003, S.231.
52) H. Yamaguchi, Nishi Doitsu ni okeru Ginko to Kigyo no Kankei (Relationship between Banks and 
Enterprises in West Gemany), Shoken Kenkyu (Financial Economic Revie), No.135, March 1981, p.113.
53) A. Busse, a. a. O., S.65.
54) L. Poullain, Tätigkeitsbericht, Stuttgart-Degerloch, 1979, S.80.
55) J. Edwards, K. Fischer, op. cit., p.215.
56) Vgl. A. Gottschalk, Der Stimmrechtseinfluβ der Banken in den Aktionärversammlungen von 
Groβunternehmen, S.299-300.
57) Ebenda, S.300, Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Hrsg.), a. a. O., S.173.
58) A. Busse, a. a. O., S.64, S.66.
59) T. Takahashi, Kigyo Soshiki to Kigyo Touchi (Organization of Enterprise and Corporate Governance), T. 
Takahashi, T. Onishi (eds.), op. cit., p.51.
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Assigning of supervisory board members occurred in financial institutions as well
60)
. 
The collection and exchange of valuable information regarding borrower corporations or 
corporations to which supervisory board members had been assigned based on personal 
ties were extremely critical.
(3) Assignment of Directors between Banks and Industries
In examining the assignment of directors between banks and industries, we find that, 
for example, according to a Monopoly Committee 1976/1977 report, among 51 surveyed 
corporations, there were 137 instances of supervisory board members being selected from 
financial institutions and 57 instances of financial institution assignees being chairmen or 
vice-chairmen. The numbers coming from the top three banks were 76 board members and 
35 chairmen or vice-chairmen, accounting for more than 55.5% and 61.4%, respectively, of 
the total assignees from financial institutions
61)
. For these 51 corporations, if financial 
institutions had more than 25% of the voting rights, they had without exception secured at 
least one supervisory position, and if the financial institutions had more than 25% stock 
holding, they procured chairman or vice-chairman positions on the super- visory board. 
Among the largest 100 corporations, 31 had financial institution representatives serving 
as chairmen of the supervisory board, 35 corporations had representatives serving as vice-
chairmen. The top three banks had 21 chairmen and 19 vice-chairmen in these 
corporations
62)
. The Gessler Committee reported that, in 74 publicly traded corporations 
surveyed in 1974 and 1975, 182 had supervisory board members assigned from financial 
institutions and 37 had chairmen of the supervisory board from financial institutions. The 
numbers of super- visory board members and chairmen assigned from the top three banks 
were 101 and 25, and respectively, accounted for 55.5% and 67.6% of those assigned from 
financial institutions. Of these 74 publicly traded corporations, that is, where a bank held 
at least 25% of the voting rights in a particular corporation, the same banks also held 
chairmanship of the supervisory board in many instances, and in an overwhelming 
number of cases, two supervisory positions
63)
.
In subsequent periods as well, the A. Gottschalk survey noted that in 1986, bankers or 
60) Vgl. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Hrsg.), a. a. O., S.591.
61) Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachte 1976/77, S.574-7.
62) Ebenda, S.303-4, S.307-8.
63) Vgl. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Hrsg.), a. a. O., S.173-4, S.436, S.438-9, S.443-5.
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former bankers had 69 (27%) of the 256 supervisory positions within 27 non-bank 
corporations. Of these, 50 positions, or roughly three-fourths, were populated by 
representatives of the top three banks
64)
. According to R. Ziegler, two if not all three of the 
top three banks had representatives serving as supervisory board members among larger 
manufacturers. One decisive factor in the banks having so many representatives was the 
economic importance of the companies accepting the representatives
65)
. H. Pfeiffer in 1993 
found that the top three banks had assigned 1,053 directors to other corporations’ 
supervisory boards in the 1990s, with 170 of them acting as supervisory board (or other 
management) chairmen, and 92 as vice-chairmen
66)
. At least one bank representative 
served as a supervisory board member in the 261 publicly traded corporations surveyed by 
H. Hansen in 1993, and 372 supervisory board members were assigned from financial 
institutions. Of these, 192 (51.6%) were from the top three banks and 59 companies had 
bank representatives serving as supervisory board chairmen. The corporations comprising 
the DAX30 had 73 supervisory positions filled by bank representatives, with 13 
corporations having bank directors in the supervisory board chairman position. The top 
three banks had a total of 56 supervisory positions in the DAX30 corporations, or 76.7% of 
the total
67)
. In roughly the same time period, one-fourth of the total market value of 
German stocks was owned by foreigners, with more than one-fifth being owned by private 
investors. However, the percentage of supervisory board positions in the DAX30 accounted 
for by these two groups of investors was no greater than roughly 5% each
68)
.
The mutual assignments of directors from industries to banks was also common; H. 
Pfeiffer (1993) noted that there were up to 5,286 cases including assignment of (1) directors 
and supervisory board members from non-bank corporations to the supervisory boards or 
boards of directors of the top three banks, (2) supervisory board members from the top 
64) A. Gottschalk, Der Stimmrechtseinfluβ der Banken in den Aktionärversammlungen von 
Groβunternehmen, S.300.
65) Vgl.R. Ziegler, Das Netz der Personen- und Kapitalverflechtungen deutscher und österreichischer 
Wirtschaftsunternehmen, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychlogie, 36.Jg, Heft 3, 1984, 
S.597.
66) Vgl.H. Pfeiffer, Die Macht der Banken. Die personellen Verflechtungen der Commerzbank, der 
Deutschen Bank und der Dresdner Bank mit Unternehemen, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, S.151, S.172, 
S.182-3.
67) H. Hansen, Das Gewicht der Banken in den Aufsichträten deutscher Aktiengesellschaften, Die 
Aktiengesellschaft, 39.Jg, Nr.3, März 1994, R.78.
68) H. Hansen, Die Zusammensetzung von Aufsichtsräten der DAX-Gesellschaften und die Auswirkungen 
auf ihre Effizienz, Die Aktiengesellschaft, 39.Jg, Nr.11, November 1994, R.404.
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three banks to the supervi-sory boards or boards of directors of non-bank corporations
69)
. 
Further, cases of corporate representatives participating in bank committees and other 
organizations existed as well. For example, the chairman of the board of chemical giant 
BASF belonged to a Deutsche Bank committee, and BASF’s supervisory board chairman 
traditionally belonged to a similar organization at Commerz Bank
70)
. Thus, supervisory 
board assignments from the top three banks to non-bank corporations and vice versa 
accounted for many of the personal ties between banks and industries.
4 System of Corporate-Bank and Inter-Corporate Information Sharing 
through the Advisory Board System
The banks’ personnel exchange structure for the sharing of information had an 
important role in complementing industry–bank relationships through the assignment of 
directors from banks. The advisory board, created for banks’ head offices and for each 
region, functioned as a focal point of information exchange between corporations and 
banks as well as among corporations themselves.
Major corporations assigned members to a central advisory board, where industry 
leaders regularly reported to each other on their markets’ conditions. As they performed 
their board roles, they received advice and guidance on various business issues
71)
. The 
central advisory board acted as a coordinating body between banks and industrial 
corporations and could be seen in Dresdner Bank prior to 1966. These boards were 
established by banks to maintain the level of personal ties, previously enjoyed in response 
to the 1965 Corporations Law’s regulation on the number of supervisory board members
72)
. 
Region specific advisory boards had existed in Deutsche and Dresdner Banks since before 
the war and postwar in Commerz Bank. Regional advisory boards included management 
representatives from various corporate sectors that served large banking customers and 
their regional organizational units. One reason for the existence of regional advisory 
boards was that they strengthened relationships among various corporations across 
69) Vgl. H. Pfeiffer, Die Macht der Banken, S.172, S.182-3.
70) H. Pfeiffer, BASF und die Deutsche Bank, WSI Mitteilungen, 42.Jg, Nr.1, Januar 1989, S.15.
71) H. O. Eglau, a. a. O., S.192-3.
72) Vgl. H. Pfeiffer, Die Macht der Banken, S.158-9, H. Pfeiffer, Groβbanken und Finanzgruppen, S.477, 
K.-H. Stanzick, Der ökonomische Konzentrationsprozeβ, G. Schäfer, C. Nedelmann (Hrsg.), Der CDU-
Staat. Analysen zur Verfassungswirklichkeit der Bundesrepublik, Bd.I, Frankfurt am Main, 1968, S.72.
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business sectors and in each region for matters of business policy
73)
. H. Pfeiffer’s 1993 
research states that, among many medium-sized businesses, the supervisory board’s 
functions of regulation, consultation, and guidance were undertaken by the advisory 
board
74)
. Persons appointed by the top three banks to the supervisory or an advisory board 
were considered “friendly”
75)
. For example, it was important for Deutsche Bank’s advisory 
board to create strong ties with the banks’ customers through its business and propose 
new operations through those ties
76)
.
In addition, several hundred business associations shared ties with banks through the 
top three banks’ supervisory board, central advisory board, or regional advisory board 
members
77)
. With these personal organizational ties, close relationships between banks 
and industries created information conduits, and were not only based on direct 
relationships between the two groups but also complemented by intermediary 
relationships of economic associations such as business and industrial associations and 
industry–bank relationships
78)
.
III Corporate Governance and Industry–Bank Relationships
1 Collaborative System of Corporate Governance Based on Industry–Bank 
Relationships
The industrial system based on industry–bank relationships created a collaborative 
system of corporate governance that has German characteristics, a phenomenon we will 
now examine.
The German segregation of authority into a two-layered system of top management for 
supervisory boards and boards of directors facilitated debates between those outside the 
73) Vgl. H. E. Büschgen, Die Groβbanken, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, S.242-3, N. Koubek, Personelle und 
institutionelle Verbindung der Bereiche „Produktion“ und „Kapital“ in der Wirtschaftsgesellschaft der 
BRD, WWI-Mitteilungen, 24.Jg, Heft 8/9, 1971, S.261.
74) H. Pfeiffer, Die Macht der Banken, S.142.
75) A. Gottschalk, Der Stimmrechtseinfluβ der Banken in den Aktionärversammlungen von 
Groβunternehmen, S.301.
76) Vgl. F. Schwarz, Die Deutsche Bank.Reise auf tünerner Füβen, Frankfurt am Main, New York, 2003, 
S.32.
77) Vgl. H. Pfeiffer, Das Imperium der Deutsche Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 1987, S.29-31.
78) Vgl. N. Koubek, a. a. O., S.262-6.
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corporation offering much valuable advice and those actually running the business. This 
dynamic’s ability to expand corporations’ views and clearly delineate responsibility was 
significant
79)
. As bank representatives acting as supervisory board members offer guidance 
on the basis of the banks’ wealth of information and know-how, this German management 
system demonstrates its importance and effectiveness as an industrial system based on 
industry–bank relationships. With such decision-making mechanisms, functions to 
monitor and regulate are exhibited by business functions centered on the board of 
directors.
The high percentage of voting rights held by banks, including voting rights through 
deposited stocks, the assignment of supervisory board members, and industry–bank 
relationships based on personal ties through representatives on advisory boards, enabled 
defensive mechanism against capital market pressures. Here, we see German 
characteristics in the corporate governance systems. With the progress of financial 
globalization since the 1990s, there was pressure on shareholder value-oriented 
management through investment funds, execution of business strategy, and selection of 
supervisory board members at annual meetings. Compared with other European countries, 
the US, and Japan, conditions in this environment reveal that the German industrial 
system enabled banks to secure management stability not only in corporations in which 
they held shares but also with borrowers.
However, with greater capital market pressures in today’s financial globalization, this 
stable system is sometimes rocked to its foundation. Beginning in the 1990s, large banks 
transited from their traditional lending business toward investment banking, and the 
assignment of directors from banks to corporations declined. Further, banks began 
accepting fewer corporation representatives for the positions of a supervisory board 
chairman
80)
. These changes by banks were another step toward globalized capitalism, and 
banks themselves were regulated by changes in the conditions for capital accumulations. 
From the perspective of corporate relationships, banks were forced to intensify their 
relationships based on “selection and concentration” to achieve greater efficiency.
79) K. Winnacker, Nie den Mut verlieren. Erinnerungen an Schicksalsjahr der deutschen Chemie, 
Düsseldorf, 1972, S.467.
80) Vgl.R. Zugehör, Die Zukunft des rheinischen Kapitalismus. Unternehmen zwischen Kapitalismus und 
Mitbestimmung. Die Zukunft des rheinischen Kapitalismus, Opladen, 2003, S.68-70, S.92-3, S.173.
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2 Codetermination and Collaborative Systems of Corporate Governance in 
Industry–Bank Relationships
It is important to consider the relationship between issues of corporate governance 
based on close ties between industries and banks and the codetermination system at the 
supervisory board level.
The authority of the supervisory board chairman was expanded under the 1976 Law on 
Codetermination. The law granted two votes to the chairman in cases of conflicts between 
shareholders and labor representatives on the supervisory board. Conditions that were in 
the interest of the investors were important for coordinating interests with the supervisory 
board chairman. In addition, the number of labor representatives on the supervisory board 
being equal to that of shareholder representatives necessitated the formation of groups. 
Also, the supervisory board chairman held authority that enabled governance of certain 
types of opinions within the groups
81)
. Primarily based on this, when bank representatives 
served as supervisory board chairmen in corporations, they found it easier to demonstrate 
the governing and coordinating functions of their role on the basis of abundant data.
With the deployment of the 1976 Law on Codetermination, the supervisory board 
would regulate its meetings that were occasionally conducted to eliminate controversial 
issues from discussion; however, some have pointed out that the supervisory board tended 
to lose its authoritative position in matters of corporate policy being discussed in a critical 
fashion. Rather than an expansive board, the supervisory board chairman often took on 
the role of a critical debater for the board of directors
82)
. In these circumstances, when 
bank representatives took over the position of the supervisory board chairman, it became 
easy to coordinate group interests based on, both internal and external, critical corporate 
information, obtained by the supervisory board chairman from banks, which were 
information sources.
The codetermination system decreases the rate of investors in the supervisory board 
and provided opportunities for autonomous corporate management. In particular, with the 
Codetermination Act for the Coal, Iron and Steel Industries and the 1976 Law on 
Codetermination requiring the proportion of labor representatives to be half of the 
supervisory board, the number of external members in the board fell. From the latter half 
of the 1970s, the 1976 Law on Codetermination tended to reduce the number of bank 
81) Vgl. H. O. Eglau, a. a. O., S.178-9.
82) Ebenda, S.166-7.
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representatives on the supervisory boards representing German corporations
83)
. 
Corporations used this as an opportunity to reduce potential external influence and 
involvement.
However, the decrease in supervisory positions held by shareholders allowed for 
conditions of easier fulfillment of banks’ interests, with banks and inter-bank alliances 
holding a superior position in exercising voting rights through deposited stocks. Further, 
through collaborations between banks and the corporations to which they assigned 
directors, the latter had greater decision-making ability, including those regarding the 
remaining supervisory board members and suppressing outside influences. For these 
reasons, collaboration with banks took on further significance for corporations.
As mentioned, the codetermination system created conditions for a more strong 
functioning industrial system based on industry–bank relationships, while suppressing 
the influence of external shareholders. For banks, this was a mechanism for regulating 
their own interests and fulfilling bank interests in corporations to which banks assigned 
directors.
Under the codetermination system, opportunities for corporations to collaborate with 
labor representatives on the supervisory board were fortified as a defense mechanism 
against external pressures, which were heavily oriented toward the pursuit of short-term 
interests and represented by investment funds in present-day terms. From the objectives 
of labor, it secured soundness and security in employment and corporate management. 
This feature further strengthened collaboration between corporations and labor. For 
capital supervisory board members, there is an industrial system based on industry–bank 
relationships in the form of collaborative network for broad personal ties. In this type of 
industrial system collaboration with supervisory board comprising capital members, such 
as bank representatives, the exercise of a defensive function becomes even stronger.
Thus, preconditions for effective, direct control through the assignment of bank 
representatives to corporate supervisory boards are met within joint-stock and limited 
liability companies under the 1976 Law of Codetermination or the Codetermination Act for 
the Coal, Iron and Steel Industries. The Act requires corporations to have codetermination 
with equal labor representation. In corporations with this type of codetermination, 
supervisory positions that banks held as creditors were effective for surveillance and 
83) J. R. Cable, The Bank-Industry Relationship in West Germany: Performance an Policy Aspects, J. 
Schwalbach (Hrsg.), Industry Structure and Performance, Berlin, 1985, p.33.
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providing approvals required by the management
84)
.
From the foregoing discussion, we see that Germany developed a system that had 
functions similar to that of corporate defense, developed to counter external pressures, and 
contrasted that of interlocking stockholdings, which characterized postwar Japan. This 
type of corporate system was supported by the industrial and codetermination systems 
based on industry–bank relationships at the supervisory board level, forming an important 
characteristic of German corporate governance.
IV Significance of New Developments in Industry–Bank 
Relationships
Our discussions to this point have examined new developments in postwar industry–
bank relationships and the industrial system upon which they were based. We will discuss 
the types and possible significance of future developments that were different from those 
in the prewar era.
First, we will establish the development of an industrial and corporate governance 
system based on banks exercising voting rights through the deposited stock system. The 
issuance business was prominent in the securities business that was based on the prewar 
universal banking system. However, in the postwar era, with the expansion of general 
investments in securities, the position of the securities business in the secondary market 
also grew. As a result, a system of bank agents exercising voting rights through the 
deposited stocks system was fully established. This practice built the essential foundation 
for both capital and personal ties for the postwar development of industrial concentration 
and the establishment of a uniquely German industrial system, facilitating information 
sharing between industries and banks and regulating their interests.
Second, we will observe the full-scale development of a network for sharing information 
between banks and industries and among corporations through the bank’s advisory board 
system and a system for regulating interests through that network. Although there were 
prewar cases of regional advisory boards, in the postwar period, central advisory boards 
were established and became the cornerstone of the advisory board system. Through the 
84) M. Wiendieck, Unternehmensfinanzierung und Kontrolle durch Banken, Deutschland── Japan──
USA, Wiesbaden, 1992, S.172, S.176.
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combination of central and regional advisory boards, a national and regional system of 
information sharing between banks and industries and among corporations themselves 
was established. These systems differed from those based on the assignment of directors 
and were used for regulating interests between banks and investors and those among 
corporations.
Third, the weakening influences and pressures from external shareholders, which 
emerged due to the codetermination system program proposing equal labor representation 
on the supervisory board, established and strengthened a corporate governance system 
based on industry–bank relationships; its roles differed from those featured during the 
prewar era. In addition, the strengthened industry–bank relationships and the industrial 
system on which they were based revealed the system’s importance.
Examining the significance of new postwar developments in industry–bank 
relationships and the cooperative characteristics of German capitalism
85)
, reveals that the 
strong influence exerted by banks on industries was due to the collaborative relationships 
between the two groups, rather than the banks’ desire to control the industries. The 
framework for bank shareholdings, the assignment of supervisory board members 
according to the exercising of voting rights based on the deposited stocks system, and the 
advisory board system resulted in information sharing and a support system dependent 
upon advice from banks and collaborative relationships with industrial corporations. 
Banks’ involvement in the joint responsibility for industrial policy and several corporate 
business policies
86)
 was an important element supporting the collaborative system, through 
which banks regulated inter-corporate interests. Directors from banks and insurance firms 
often played an important role in the formation of personal ties among competing 
corporations
87)
. Further, the German-style system of corporate governance based on the 
codetermination system and the inter-corporate collaborations that the system supported 
complemented this industrial system’s collaborative structure. The industrial system was 
further complemented by the inter-corporate assignment of directors and interlocking of 
directorates
88)
. This postwar German-style industrial system based on industry–bank 
85) A. D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Harvard University 
Press, 1990.
86) A. Busse, a. a. O., S.61.
87) Vgl. A. Pfannschmidt, a. a. O., S.274.
88) Vgl. D. Schönwitz, H. J. Weber, Unternehmenskonzentration, Personelle Verflechtungen und 
Wettbewerb── Eine Unterschung auf Basis der 100 gröβten Konzern der BRD, Baden-Baden, 1982, C. 
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relationships combined these elements and functioned in a framework that deeply 
connected each element.
Although major changes can be seen in the 1990s and thereafter, this collaborative 
structure in the postwar era enabled corporate management to not only plan for business 
expansion from a long-term perspective but also suppress the influence of external 
shareholders and the pressures of the capital market. This structure constituted 
significant German development within the Americanization of business management, as 
management pursued business expansion with a long-term perspective in line with 
German and European market structures, which were central to German exports.
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